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1. TAKE-OFF FOR EU CONFLICT PREVENTION? 
 
The European Union is both a pioneer of and a latecomer in conflict prevention. It is a 
pioneer with regard to advancing the idea of conflict prevention among the European nation 
states. In fact, the main purpose of the fifty year old unification process in Europe was to bind 
France and Germany as well as other states of the continent together in order to ensure that 
they would not go to war again as in the centuries before. By pooling their sovereignty around 
a supranational core the Member States of the EU decided to entangle their future in 
commonly agreed rules and institutions and to invite other European states to join the 
enterprise. The union has grown to fifteen and will witness the accession of ten more 
members in 2004, increasing the population of the EU to almost half a billion.
2 Thus, 
European states have turned from a tradition of belligerency and repeated fighting to a culture 
of co-operation and peaceful conflict resolution among themselves.  
Now that the European Project is so advanced, many wonder whether the European 
Union can reproduce such a success story beyond its borders. Here one can notice that the EU 
is also a latecomer to conflict prevention. Brussels is not yet well enough equipped to reliably 
assume such international security tasks. The EU’s security policy pales in comparison with 
the Union’s status as a world trade power, who has a weighty common currency, an 
environmental policy with clear contours and whose legal policy positions have proved to be 
enforceable. In addition, as one of the world's major donor organisations, the Union has 
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obtained the image of a humanitarian superpower. Thus, the Union’s weak record  in 
managing conflicts,  in defending itself and  in establishing violence-free zones outside of 
Europe is all the more astonishing.   
 
Policies such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) have been created in part to remedy the above-mentioned 
shortcomings. However, their creation has been more a formal than a substantial step forward. 
It remains uncertain whether the Franco-German plans for a European Security and Defence 
Union and the respective suggestions made at the European Convention for the Constitutional 
Treaty will substantially change the situation and give the Union a higher degree of 
independence. Furthermore, attempts to incorporate the concept of  international conflict 
prevention into the Union have also been disappointing. In 2000/2001 the preventative 
approach was programmatically launched with much optimism and integrated in small 
operative steps into the Union’s foreign, development and security policy activities. But 
neither have there been many instances of success nor has the EU’s international standing 
changed. Finally, the ‘partnership for global prevention,’ announced during the Swedish 
presidency, has not yet materialised.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that the direction of development is 
misguided. Rather, a global ‘culture of conflict prevention’ (Kofi Annan) is desirable, and the 
EU remains basically predestined to make a leading contribution. The EU could create for 
itself an unmistakable profile in this area and thus tip the international strategic scales’ 
balance further towards Europe. The EU’s tendencies and tasks allow it neither to remain a 
civil power nor to become a military superpower.
3 Nevertheless, the EU must make its mark 
internationally. For this to happen, the EU and its Member States must  become more 
decisively committed to preventive policy. Conflict prevention should be anchored in the new 
Constitutional Treaty as a goal and task, efficiency in decision making should be ensured 
through qualified majority voting, and actions should be supported by a foreign minister, who 
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has the right of initiative, along with the ability and the necessary staff to carry out actions.
4 
When this happens, prevention will no longer simply be a label of European foreign and 
security policy, indeed prevention will then move forward to become the Union’s trademark. 
But is Brussels really moving in this direction? Will EU conflict prevention take off? For the 
time being the EU is considering preventive engagement rather than practising it. The EU will 
have to raise the stakes and shift to more risk-taking policies if it really wants to make an 
impact. 
 
2. CONSIDERING PREVENTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
 
Despite its well accepted plausibility the concept of conflict prevention remains at the 
margins of the EU’s external relations  and CFSP. Technically, some rhetoric, goals and 
measures of prevention have been introduced but the subject has not yet been politically 
mainstreamed. The concept of prevention has not yet been internalised by EU policy makers. 
Conflict prevention is not a (let alone the) dominant strategic approach. To the extent that 
proactive activities are launched under the heading of conflict prevention, they are driven by 
missed opportunities, by financial considerations, and by competition among major actors 
inside and outside the EU. 
 
2.1.   Driven by opportunities missed: Too big to opt out 
 
Today’s EU approach to conflict prevention dates back to two main sources. One is 
connected to developments in the mid-1990s when the EU witnessed mass killings in regions 
like the Western Balkans as well as in sub-Saharan Africa. Although these conflicts had been 
recognised as critical cases before they truly ignited, the international community, including 
the EU and its Member States, did not intervene early enough to avoid genocide and massive 
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destruction. The other development that acted as an impetus to the current EU approach 
towards conflict prevention is more recent and stems from the EU’s experience both in the 
Kosovo war and after September 11, when Washington dominated international crisis 
management to such an extent that the Europeans had no choice but to follow the lead of the 
United States. In the most recent case of Iraq, Washington did not manage to get all the 
Europeans on board, but, here too, the US created a situation within which – this time after 
the war – the Europeans seemed to have no option but to join America in rebuilding law and 
order in the country.  
An evaluation of the events that took place since the early 1990s made the EU and its 
Member States feel that, had they only acted earlier, they could have made a difference by 
reducing the large scale of human suffering. Likewise, they could have protected their 
investments in foreign and development aid, which were eventually wiped out within days or 
weeks by  civil war and transborder fighting. It was decided that the human and the material 
cost of doing ‘too little too late’ required a change in the EU’s approach to the developing 
world as well as to the states in transition in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and in the former 
Soviet Union.  
The opportunities missed in Kosovo to stop the escalation of the conflict between the 
Serbs and the Albanians and the subsequent military intervention including the heavy 
bombing of Serbia made the Europeans think twice. It is difficult to see how a European 
civilian approach could have changed Mr. Milosevic’s mind, just as it is inconceivable how 
an EU policy could have neutralised the Bin Laden driven terrorism or could have driven 
Saddam Hussein from his authoritarian throne. But European capitals and publics were deeply 
concerned by the course of these three events, which all led to massive military responses 
carried out primarily by the United States.  
The failure of the United States to obtain a UN mandate for the invasion of Iraq is 
symptomatic of the aversion that certain EU Member States feel towards simply rubber-
stamping American military action. America’s decision to proceed anyway reinforced the pre-
existing notion in Europe that another approach to crisis management was necessary. This 
view also prevails in those European Capitals that had opted to support Washington’s military 
approach. Hence the logical conclusion was made that the EU must act earlier, in more 
forceful, and in better targeted, ways. Brussels was encouraged in these conclusions by the 
wider debate on the international stage, particularly on the level of the G-8 nations and within   5 
the UN.
5 These bodies advocated a shift in emphasis from crisis management and postwar 
reconstruction to early action and the prevention of violent conflict.  
One could see this change in policy in its embryonic stage, far before the Iraq crisis 
began, when looking at various policy papers written by those responsible for EU foreign 
policy. Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the heads of state and government assigned 
the Presidency, the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative of CFSP (SG/HR) 
and the European Commission the task of developing a comprehensive conflict prevention 
policy. As a result, three policy papers were published in short succession: 
 
-  Joint report of the SG/HR and of the EU Commissioner for Foreign Relations (November 
2000)
 6 
-  Communication of the European Commission on Conflict Prevention (April 2001)
 7 
-  EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (June 2001), passed by the  
European Council during the Swedish EU presidency.
 8 
 
Although each of these papers looked at conflict prevention from a different 
perspective, certain themes – such as efficient institutional co-operation, a need to strengthen 
the available instruments, and the involvement of Member States – were prevalent.
9  
After recognising the new strategy that has developed in the Union, it is important to 
determine to what extent the EU is capable of taking action. What are its constraints and what 
remains unknown. As mentioned above, the Union is not a superpower in the real sense of the 
word, and must therefore determine where and how it can most effectively intervene. Thus, 
those responsible within the Union have the task of selecting from the list of conflicts, those 
that are most relevant for the EU and then deciding what approach should be taken. For 
example, an intranational and potentially violent conflict such as that in Algeria demands a 
different approach than the increasing number of long-term regional conflicts (such as in 
Central Africa) or the growing situations of postwar support (such as in Kosovo). At the same 
time, it does not suffice to devote the Union’s attention to single critical countries; as long as  
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‘violence-prone’ areas are expanding the so-called new risks are increasing on a global 
dimension, and the exact sources of the most dangerous forms of international terrorism 
remain diffuse. The EU needs a broader strategy.  
In Brussels, the choice of means is undertaken according to Member States’ interests 
and their ability to push through these interests at the EU level, which cannot always be 
generically determined. Only when confronted with a  concrete situation will it become 
evident in how far the European actors feel affected, to what degree they want to become 
involved and what efforts they are actually capable of making. As is always the case, the 
ability to move forward on integration is dependent upon the Member States' political will.  
In addition to the Member States however, one must also recognise how the agenda 
and priorities of the EU are often compelled by external circumstances. These circumstances 
include such diverse factors  as the dramatic situation in the conflict area itself, media 
influences, campaigns of non-governmental actors and inquiries to ‘Europe’ by third parties, 
which the Brussels institutions and some of the more influential EU capitals cannot ignore. 
Furthermore, global (UN, World Bank) and regional (OSCE, Council of Europe) 
organisations to which the EU itself belongs force the EU’s hand, and that includes pressure 
on the part of the U.S.A. and other close partners. They all assume that the EU has a 
potentially strong intervention capability and can thus make a major European contribution to 
help alleviate international violent conflicts. Because of the numerous expectations, Brussels 
is relieved of the task of setting its own agenda, for the agenda is already overly full. 
Adhering to this agenda allows the EU to increase its efficiency while pleasing third parties.  
Finally, it becomes noticeable when considering conflict prevention activities that the 
Union’s foreign and security policy is still in an initial and experimental phase. Thus topics on 
the EU agenda and what happens to them often (inadvertently) become test cases for 
Europeans’  political unanimity, their decisiveness of action, their material independence and 
the professional execution. For s ome time, the area of conflict prevention
10 has been 
developing and is being tested as a new area of European security policy. What have the EU 
and its Member States set out to accomplish and how far do their ambitions reach?
11 These 
                                                                 
10 In this study the term conflict prevention refers to efforts to restrain and prevent violent conflicts, before, 
during and/or after the outbreak of combat. According to this  definition preventive policy is carried out through 
military and/or non-military means. Furthermore, conflict prevention is distinguished from the term crisis 
management which is used here so as to include military activities during the war-like phase of a conflict. In EU 
political practice, this distinction is not consistently used. Even if an EU action is primarily devoted to conflict 
prevention, it is often described (inaccurately) as crisis management. Military actions classifiable as pre-emptive 
strikes belong in their own category of conflict policy which for the purposes of this article is considered neither 
as conflict prevention nor as crisis management. 
11 For a detailed answer to this question, see Arzu Hatakoy, ‘Konfliktprävention und Krisenmanagement in der 
Europäischen Union’, Aktuelle SWP-Dokumentation, Reihe D, No. 27 (2002).   7 
questions are not only of empirical interest. As such diverse events as the forced regime 
change in Iraq and the debate in the European Convention demonstrate, the EU’s image and 
influence in the rest of the world are at stake: Brussels cannot opt out.  
 
2.2.   Financial motivation: protecting the EU’s investments 
 
Contrary to common wisdom, conflict prevention is expensive, at least in all those 
cases where structural prevention is required and certainly in those cases where one wants to 
be sure that conflict prevention is successful. Is the EU prepared to accept that conflict 
prevention policy requires ‘double’ funding: first, for the build-up of those preventive 
capacities that the EU still lacks, and, second, for running the agenda of day-to-day cases of 
prevention. Looking at the huge cobweb of financial relations which the EU has built up over 
the last decades, it seems that both the money and the procedures are in place to support 
extensive policies of EU conflict prevention.  
As the 2001 Report of the European Commission points out, financial assistance to 
third countries is one of the central components of the Union’s external action, alongside trade 
policy and political dialogue.
12 It is thus an important tool for promoting the fundamental 
values of the EU and for m eeting the global challenges of the twenty-first century, such as 
conflict prevention and peace building. Brussels is one of the major actors in international co-
operation and development assistance, donating just over 8 billion EUR per year since 2001 
(see  the  Overview ‘External Action and Pre-accession Aid Budget’). Protecting that 
investment is an additional motivation for the European Union to be involved in conflict 
prevention, and in part,  it counteracts the huge cost of involvement. Referring to T able 1 
below, one can see that the vast majority of the External Action and Pre-accession Aid Budget 
is dedicated to regional co-operation and assistance, while a little less than a fourth of the 
Budget is reserved for food and humanitarian aid or other more general co-operation 
measures, such as the European initiative for democracy and human rights. Another 
interesting perspective that can be gained by looking at the chart is the fact that more than a 
third of the entire Budget is allotted to the Pre-accession strategy and aid. Resolving problems 
in those countries that may one day be members of the Union takes priority. Finally, the 
further away a region is from Europe, the less that region obtains in aid. In reality, the reverse 
should be true, given that the costs of stabilisation grow with the distance from Brussels.  
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Just like other international donors the EU is faced with the challenge of increasing the 
quality, focus, and impact of its financial assistance throughout the world. This challenge, 
along with the new focus on conflict prevention, is the main reason why the Commission 
launched a fundamental reform of its external assistance in 2001. This included concentrating 
development assistance on a limited number of priority areas with the overriding objectives of 
poverty reduction in developing countries worldwide and better integration of the partner 
countries into the global economy. In parallel, the Commission embarked on an ambitious 
programme of measures to make significant improvements in the quality and the timely 
delivery of projects while ensuring robust financial management. This reform has been driven 
further to include security policy goals in EU programmes. 
 
Table 1:  External Action and Pre-accession Aid Budget  
       External Action           Amount (Million EURO) 
  2001  2002  2003 
Action defined by geographical area       
Pre-accession strategy  3 240.0  3 328.0  3 386.0 
Pre-accession aid (Mediterranean Countries)       19.0       21.0    174.0 
Co-operation with the Balkans     839.0     765.0     684.6 
Co-operation with Mediterranean third countries 
and the Middle East 
   896.3     861.3    753.9 
Assistantship to partner countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia 
   469.3     473.9    507.4 
Co-operation with Asia     446.0     488.0    562.5 
Co-operation with Latin America     336.3     346.7    337.0 
Co-operation with southern Africa and South 
Africa 
   122.0     124.8     127.0 
Food aid and humanitarian aid operations       
Food aid and support operations     455.0     455.0    425.6 
Humanitarian aid     473.0     441.8    441.7 
General Co-operation Measures       
Other co-operation measures     389.5     419.6    505.5 
International fisheries agreements     273.4     193.2    192.5 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
framework of the different external aid programmes of the Commission in 2000, except pre-accession 
instruments, macro-financial aid, CFSP and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism.   9 
External aspects of certain Community policies       71.8       78.7       79.9 
European initiative for democracy and human 
rights 
   102.0     104.0    106.0 
Reserve for administrative expenditure            4.4 
CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)      36.0       30.0       47.5 
Total  8168.7  8 131.0  8 335.4 
Source: EU Budget 2001, 2002 and 2003 
Late in 2001 the Commission adopted a Communication which proposes to improve 
the procedures for funding civilian crisis management under the CFSP. The Commission 
aimed to circumvent the financial constraints and procedural obstacles to CFSP operations by 
establishing a new flexibility instrument for funding civilian crisis interventions and 
facilitating recourse to the current emergency reserve. In parallel, an inter-institutional 
agreement was concluded with the Budgetary Authority regarding three categories of crisis 
management operations that can be financed by the EU: 
-  Operations carried out in the framework of a Community instrument under the first pillar 
(mine-sweeping, emergency civilian aid, civil protection aid, human rights, strengthening 
institutions, election observation missions, food aid, rebuilding infrastructure and 
economic aid); 
-  CFSP operations without any military or defence implications that are funded from the 
CFSP budget line (the Council decides on common action and the budget, while the 
Commission makes commitments, signs contracts and releases funds); and 
-  CFSP operations with military or defence implications that do not fall under the EU budget 
(like the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force). 
 
The Commission concluded that the budgetary procedures applying to CFSP 
operations are too cumbersome and that the CFSP budget would be insufficient if the EU 
were to decide to extend, for example, the surveillance mission in the Balkans or to launch a 
huge policing operation. The Commission suggested to the Council the use of a new crisis 
flexibility instrument which makes it possible to mobilise funds even when there is no budget 
latitude left and, more importantly, without having to change the Financial Perspectives in the 
framework of the habitual Community budget. Thus, it tried to counter the option being 
examined by the Council (which had the support of a range of Member States) of funding 
civilian CFSP operations in a crisis situation through a new ad hoc fund having recourse to 
funding from the Member States.   10 
 
Funding via Member States may appear attractive, but it raises a number of questions: 
-  the Treaty does not cover the issue of how such a fund would be managed and controlled 
(unless it were managed by the Commission, like the European Development Fund); 
-  the lack of parliamentary control would raise serious doubts concerning the obligation to be 
accountable for the breakdown of responsibility between the two branches of the 
Budgetary Authority; and 
-  an ad hoc fund outside the regular budget might be seen as a way of getting round the 
normal budget procedures. 
The Commission demonstrated that even if the funding of such operations from the 
existing budget procedure has been over-bureaucratic in the past, the Community’s budget 
remains the best way to fund operations because it is the best way of ensuring good 
governance and transparency and the coherence of the EU’s actions under both the CFSP and 
the Community itself.
13 The question of financing may at first appear minute and simply a 
matter of bureaucratic reshuffling, but it is actually a matter of how projects should best be 
organised internally, so that they are efficient and well targeted externally. 
In fact, good financial governance may well drive the EU’s conflict prevention 
strategy and future agenda. Budget constraints are likely to raise more fundamental questions 
regarding alternative spending. EU governments may invest in de-escalation measures rather 
than crisis intervention or postwar reconstruction. They may want to launch prevention 
policies as a protection against capital loss of aid in case of civil war and devastation in 
developing countries.  
 
2.3.   Stimulated by competition – Inside and outside the Union  
 
To have more influence in the day-to-day developments in conflict areas, however, the 
EU must expand its sphere of influence beyond that of humanitarian and financial assistance. 
This will prove more complicated than one would hope. The complexity of the EU’s conflict 
prevention policy was alluded to earlier, when both the interest of the Member States and that 
of external actors were cited as sources of influence for the EU’s conflict prevention policy. 
Co-ordinating both internally and externally is a  difficult assignment, and one that the 
Communitarian institutions of the Union have not yet been able to fulfil.  
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To date, the developments in conflict prevention constitute a noteworthy expansion of 
the intergovernmental structures within the EU and thus more responsibility for Member 
States. The Communitarian institutions, the Commission and Parliament seem to have missed 
the opportunity to  develop  more strongly  their positions in the new areas of conflict 
prevention and crisis management. Telling is the development of the High Representative’s 
role, as his function could have been interpreted and shaped as Communitarian. Instead, due 
to the lack of support from the common foreign and development policy,  Javier Solana 
oriented himself towards the Council committees, the foreign ministers and the presidency 
rather than towards the Commission and Parliament.
14 This institutional shift has had positive 
effects on the EU’s visibility and its will to act, but this runs to the detriment of wide political 
acceptance and the Europe-wide democratic legitimisation of the often cost-intensive and 
politically controversial EU interventions.
15  
The EU needs to take its fate into its own hands, but it does so only to a limited extent. 
The EU is a ware of this deficiency, but sometimes hides behind the alleged lacking 
willingness to integrate on the part of some Member States. One can also observe finger-
pointing among the EU internal actors, both at the EU level between institutions and between 
the European and Member State levels. No wonder that the EU is being pressured from the 
outside to take more initiative and shoulder more responsibility and burdens in this field of 
external relations. 
The Belgian and Spanish presidencies have not noticeably furthered the conflict 
prevention dossier of the Swedish presidency. Madrid’s annual report on EU conflict 
prevention, presented in June 2002 in Seville, is flimsy.
16 The Danish presidency, too, did not 
contribute much, and the Greek presidency did not seem to do any better.
17 Both Commission 
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policy have been subject to, has been minimal  - restricted, in fact, to the domain of budget proposals. The 
democratic deficit must be made good.’ Tobias Debiel and Martina Fischer,  Crisis Prevention and Conflict 
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representatives and the Council administration bemoan the Member States’ hesitant attitude, 
their lack of consensus and political will. It has been claimed that the effectiveness of EU 
initiatives, especially prevention measures, has been decisively weakened.
18  
The shift of the main prevention activities from communitarian policies to 
CFSP/ESDP gives the Member States a larger share of the responsibility and the burden. They 
do not yet rise to the occasion. Recently, some have worked at making progress on their own, 
single state prevention policy.
19 But it is those Member States which have not yet declared the 
prevention of violent conflicts a foreign, security and development policy priority which 
present a problem. Their participation in improving conflict prevention policy at the EU level 
leaves much to be desired. They have no understanding whatsoever of the policy area, they 
have shown a lack of commitment in the wake of several critical cases, and they do not 
support EU institutions in the new and difficult field. 
However, one must recognise that a certain reorientation has occurred. Some Member 
States have taken the Göteborg Appeal seriously and have allocated funds of their own for 
conflict prevention (Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, Spain), others have increased existing 
budgets (Great Britain,  the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Finland). Although individual 
Member States have done more for their prevention policy, this change is hardly noticeable at 
the EU level, except in the building of ESDP capacities.
20 Not enough momentum has been 
built to overcome the EU’s various structural weaknesses (finance volume, HR/Commission 
relationship, the use of military/non-military instruments, and points of intersection with the 
international community). 
How can Member States be moved to assume more collective responsibility? Political 
will certainly cannot be forced through majority decisions in the Council, even though this 
path –especially in the light of an enlarged EU – should be widened wherever possible. It is 
more likely, however, that progress can be expected through an increased participation of 
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Foreign Policy Centre London, 8 February 2001).  The HR articulates similar sentiments: ‘Efficient structures, 
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19 See Luc van de Goor/Martina Huber (eds.), Mainstreaming conflict prevention. Concept and practice. SWP-
Conflict Prevention Network (Berlin, SWP-CPN 2001).  
20 For a closer look at the matter see Reinhardt Rummel, ‘From Weakness to Power with ESDP?’ 7 European 
Foreign Affairs Review (2002), pp. 453-471.   13 
national representatives in the decision and implementation process in Brussels. That means 
that the foreign and security policy tasks will be fulfilled more and more on a European and 
less on a national level.  That would fit with the ideas discussed in the European Convention 
and partly represented in the draft EU Constitution, namely the establishment of a foreign 
policy bureaucracy within the Council as a quasi-EU Foreign Ministry in conjunction with the 
aforementioned combination of the functions of the External Relations Commissioner and the 
HR. 
As long as the EU and its Members States are not able to take conflict prevention 
initiatives or conduct them autonomously, the co-operation with Third Countries and 
international organisations offers a solution. But such partnerships do not come about by 
themselves, unless the EU restricts itself to financially supporting other actors’ measures. 
Rather, the overriding experience has been that the various actors in conflict prevention are 
active without any co-ordination among each other. They co-ordinate neither the development 
of prevention strategies nor their execution.
21 Concerted action can most likely be found 
among declarations of intent. The EU runs into international competition when trying to raise 
its international status. 
The EU has supported the UN Secretary-General and participated in the dialogue with 
representatives of the UN system. This dialogue has been encouraged during the last decade 
primarily with the international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF), but has also always 
dwindled again. Reasons can be found on both sides. Currently it does not seem like the HR 
or the Commission will be able to sustain and substantiate this dialogue. This is to a large 
extent, but not entirely, a question of external representation and of the international legal 
personality of the EU – an issue that was rightfully taken up at the Convention and is evident 
in the draft EU Constitution. The international financial institutions are partially not capable 
of prevention because their bylaws explicitly forbid them from intervening in political 
conflicts, leaving them to concentrate on reconstruction.  
On a positive note, the EU has successfully used the G8, in which the EU is 
represented several-fold (four Member States, presidency, Commission) as a forum for the 
definition and promotion of the preventative concept, but also for concrete issues (small 
firearms control,  the  diamond trade, child soldiers, etc.). Thanks primarily to the EU 
                                                                 
21 The heads of state and government have realised ever since passing the European Programme that the EU 
must seek co-operation with other international actors: ‘The EU must build and sustain mutually reinforcing and 
effective partnerships for prevention with the UN, the OSCE and other international and regional organisations 
as well as civil society. Increased co-operation is needed at all levels, from early warning and analysis to action 
and evaluation. Field co-ordination is of particular importance. EU action should be guided by principles of 
value added and comparative advantage.’ (European Programme, loc. cit. 7, p. 10).   14 
representatives, the G8 heads of state and government  present new initiatives year by  year 
(from Okinawa to Genoa, from Kananaskis to Evian) reminding those in power that 
worldwide conflict prevention needs improvement, emphasising the role of the UN Charter 
and advocating the sustainable strengthening of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
Although the G8 regularly goes through the agenda of the most important regional crises, 
there was little inclination on the part of the participating EU Member States and the 
Commission to give the group an operative conflict prevention task.
22 
In the EU dialogue with regional organisations modest progress has been made, 
especially within Europe (OSCE, Council of Europe) and in terms of experience exchange 
and training. Less successful is the attempt to institutionalise an EU-NATO dialogue which, 
in addition to crisis management tasks, could also address questions of mutual support during 
prevention operations. Maybe the new Berlin-Plus-Agreement will change this. On the other 
hand, there are already existing forms of pragmatic co-operation in the field (Western 
Balkans). Whether the EU’s i ntent to strengthen the prevention capabilities of regional 
(ASEAN, SARC, AU) and sub-regional (SADCC, ECOWAS, IGAD) organisations with an 
expandable mandate for conflict prevention can be realised, seems questionable for the time 
being. 
Nevertheless, this direction of increasing local actors’ own responsibility in the 
conflict areas should be supported wholeheartedly. One should not expect miracles from these 
efforts, especially not in terms of directly taking weight off the EU’s shoulders. The HR and 
the Commission have tried beyond the state level to intensify contact with relevant NGOs, 
academic institutions and the private sector to promote the cause of conflict prevention. This 
has been most successful with NGOs, which were assigned tasks within EuropeAid projects 
including contacts with non-governmental organisations and groups in the conflict region. A 
similarly close relationship with the private sector and the academic world has not 
materialised.
23 
The improvement of EU bodies in jointly tackling the task of conflict prevention is 
only a relative progress. The historically ingrained dysfunctional institutional structures are 
too deep-rooted as that one policy area could make them more flexible. The Member States 
are reluctant to give up competencies and capabilities to Brussels, but  do not take over 
                                                                 
22 R. Rummel, ‘Advancing the EU’s conflict prevention policy’, in John J. Kirton and Radoslava N. Stefanova 
(eds.), Conflict Prevention: G8, United Nations, and EU Governance (Aldershot 2004), pp. 224-255. See also 
the chapter by John Kirton in this volume. 
23 The European NGOs specialising in conflict prevention formed the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 
(EPLO) in Brussels in the year 2000 for lobbying and to serve as a contact for the EU institutions. EPLO itself 
has not yet intervened in conflict regions to support local NGOs there or to assume prevention tasks themselves.   15 
themselves. The EU and its Member States have a wide range of international partners, but 
the co-operation is sporadic and cannot be concentrated strategically. Among EU institutions 
and  among international actors we still find complacency and competition rather than 
commitment and co-operation that characterises conflict prevention policies. Which 
preventive achievements can be realised under these circumstances? 
 
3.  PRACTISING CONFLICT PREVENTION 
 
Since its programmes were announced in 2000/2001, all foreign, security and 
development policy activities of the EU have been under the heading of conflict prevention. 
The official catalogue of tasks with the express objective of prevention is discussed at the 
beginning of each new presidency. The list is compiled by the Policy Unit with the help of 
Council bodies, the Commission and the Member States. Ex post these topics appear in the 
presidency’s annual report, augmented with conclusions for the further development of the 
EU’s prevention policy. The topic list is treated confidentially for good reason, even though 
conclusions can be made from current EU activities to the operative agendas.   
This helps one to obtain an idea of the extent and ambition of EU activities from a 
variety of sources, such as Council meeting agendas, missions from HR Javier Solana, the 
introduction of country strategy papers by the Commission and the official reports and 
hearings of the European Parliament on foreign policy issues.
24 The parliamentary controlling 
activities, including budgetary debates, offer hints about the effectiveness of EU policy. These 
need also to include field reports and research analyses in order to assess the contribution of 
EU measures to the reduction of violent conflicts. Such an evaluative analysis would 
necessitate extensive investigations which cannot be conducted within the framework of this 
article. Instead, an overview of recent EU activity concerning acute, regional, and structural 
cases should help to make a preliminary assessment.
25 
 
3.1.  Immediate reward: Rapid Reaction Mechanism  
                                                                 
24 For a detailed account of some concrete EU prevention activities, see Renata Dwan, in SIPRI Yearbook 
(Stockholm, 2002). For a description of the range of EU conflict prevention activities, see also Reinhardt 
Rummel, ‘EU-Friedenspolitik durch Konfliktprävention: Erfahrungen mit dem Conflict Prevention Network 
(CPN)’, in Peter Schlotter (ed.), Macht-Europa-Frieden, Band 30 AFK-Friedensschriften (Hamburg 2003), pp. 
178-211.  
25 The evaluation of the effects of preventive activities is a difficult task. Neither scholars nor practitioners have 
been able to develop satisfactory approaches.  For an overview of approaches from an EU perspective see 
Michael Lund/Guenola Rasmoelina (eds.), ‘The Impact of Conflict Prevention – Cases, Measures, Assessment’,  
in CPN Yearbook 1999/2000 (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2000).   16 
  
When the first efforts of conflict prevention were mounted on the ground, it soon 
became apparent that the EU did not so much suffer from a lack of funding as from the red 
tape involved in accessing it as well as the unavailability of qualified intervention personnel. 
As Chris Patten phrased it: ‘The important thing about conflict prevention is that it should be 
quick and effective, and I repeat the word ‘quick’.’
26 Already in December 1999, the 
European Council of Helsinki assigned the Commission the task of setting up a framework for 
immediate action. Quite some time later, in February 2001, the General Council accepted an 
agreement for such an immediate action fund. Since then, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
(RRM) has been used both for necessary immediate action in acute crisis situations (such as in 
Macedonia in late 2001) and for start-up financing for programmes needing more long-term 
follow-up measures (such as in Afghanistan in early 2002 and in Central Asia in July 2003). 
RRM provides quickly accessible funds to help alleviate crisis situations (like in Nepal in 
August 2002) as well as to support peace initiatives (such as in Congo-Brazzaville and Sri 
Lanka in 2003).  
Since its launching in 2001, RRM has been deployed in numerous situations around 
the globe. In its first year, RRM was deployed on a total of four occasions, that number more 
than doubled in 2002 and will again be amply used in 2003 (see Table 2 ‘Deployment of 
RRM in 2001-2003’). RRM measures should contribute to creating specific conditions to 
ensure greater success for EU prevention policy and its co-operation and development 
programmes.
27 The edge that RRM has over the previously deployed EU instruments lies in 
its quick and flexible deployment which allows it to react to tense situations immediately 
before, during and after crises occur. Or as Commissioner Patten emphasised: ‘In times of 
urgent needs we cannot anymore afford the luxury to be bogged down by bureaucratic 
constraints and deliver Community instruments with unnecessary delays.’
28 RRM can be 
deployed worldwide and – in combination with other measures – it can be tailored to the 
demands of a specific crisis situation. The EU and especially the Commission, which 
administers the fund, are now in a better starting position. Not only can they act quickly by 
                                                                 
26 Chris Patten, Remarks made in the European Parliament, Brussels, 17 January 2001. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/rrf_17_01_01.htm. 
27 Potential areas of intervention: alleviation of financial crises, human rights work, election monitoring, 
institution-building, support of independent media, border security, humanitarian aid, clearing landmines, police 
force training, providing police equipment, emergency aid, reconstruction measures, resettlement, conflict 
mediation.  
28 European Commission, Council adopts Rapid Reaction Mechanism, Press Information, 26 February 2001. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/ip_01_255.htm .  In response to Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, OJEC [2001] L 57/5.   17 
avoiding bureaucratic hurdles, they can also make their other traditional instruments more 
effective.  
However, the financial resources are still modest. The total budget for RRM in 2001 
was EUR 20 million, of which 18 million were actually spent. The yearly budget was 
increased to  EUR  25 million  in 2002 and will remain at this level until 2006. The main 
purpose of the funds will be to enable quick stabilising measures to be undertaken, usually 
preceding longer-term aid measures. The concert of RRM and of reconstruction efforts (as in 
the case of Sri Lanka) promises to become a successful pattern of response.  
It is important to distinguish between the application area of RRM and the 
humanitarian aid guidelines of the EU. Intervention on the basis of RRM occurs with the 
objective of maintaining and rebuilding social structures necessary for political, social and 
economic stability. While ECHO, the European Commission Humanitarian Office, is 
politically neutral, RRM acts in crises situations and pursues specific political goals. Thus the 
EU does not merely continue in its well-established role as a donor organisation; instead, it, 
too, becomes a ‘player’ expressing an interest in shaping the situation.In addition to this 
politicisation of RRM, the ‘Secrecy Code,’ which could possibly impede access to written 
documents concerning ‘military or non-military crisis management operations,’ causes some 
to question the level of transparency of RRM-sponsored measures.
29 Yet those who initially 
worked on the concept shared this fear: ‘There is a need for maximum transparency in all 
matters concerning the implementation of the Community’s financial assistance as well as 
proper control of the use of appropriations.’
30 This discrepancy is undoubtedly one of the 
disadvantages of the acceleration process for RRM interventions, but is it a cause for concern?  
The EU has not yet u ndertaken a systematic evaluation of its interventions, thus 
making it difficult to assess the performance of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The Spanish 
presidency’s statements about EU conflict prevention policy are hesitant and even concede 
that not all EU efforts were successful.
31 Yet this is far from damning. A true evaluation 
should be undertaken to determine how effective current EU action is and how it can be 
improved. Until then, providing the EU with the opportunity to gain experience with this 
mechanism seems appropriate. Within very tight financial restraints the EU can and should be 
able to test its ability to respond (early warning plus early action). If the experiences are 
positive, an increase of funds could be taken into consideration, and, possibly, the SG/HR 
                                                                 
29 Jane Backhurst, ‘The Rapid Reaction Facility: good news for those in crisis?’  World Vision 
http://www.oneworld.org/voice/jane2b.html. 
30 Council Regulation No. 381/2001, OJEC [2001] L 57/5. 
31 Spanish Presidency Report on Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts,   18 
could then be given direct access to the fund as the European Convention and the draft EU 
Constitution suggest. 
 
Table 2: Deployment of RRM from 2001 to 2003 
Time 
period 
Target 
region 
Objectives and measures taken  Costs 
August 
2001 
Macedonia  Programme of trust-building measures 
Reconstruction of houses destroyed in combat in 
the regions near Tetovo and Skopska Crna Gora 
€ 2.5 Mil.   
October  
2001 
 
Macedonia  Programme of trust-building measures to support  
Ohrid Agreement 
-  Improving the infrastructure 
-  Clearing landmines  
-  Other trust-building measures on the civil 
society level and in the media 
-  Reform of public administration and support 
of police reform  
€ 10.3 Mil. 
 
2001  Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
-  Facilitating inter-Congolese dialogue 
-  Measures to support the reintegration of child 
soldiers 
-  Support of independent media 
-  Other trust-building measures 
€ 2.0 Mil.  
December 
2001 
 
 
Afghanistan  Programme for initiating the political, social and 
economic reconstruction of Afghanistan 
-  Technical assistance to enable the interim 
administration to begin work 
-  Support of United Nations efforts, especially 
those of Special Representative Brahimi 
-  Landmine clearing, support of independent 
media, support of civil society in Pakistan 
-  Contribution to the preparation of the donor 
nation conference in Brussels (20./21. 
December 2001) 
€ 4.9 Mil.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
(18/6/2002) No: 9991/02. http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st09/09991en2.pdf.   19 
-  Identification of further possible measures in 
Afghanistan and neighbouring countries 
January 
2002 
Nepal  Financing an evaluation mission to ascertain 
possibilities of short and long-term conflict 
prevention strategies 
Early 2002  Papua New 
Guinea, 
Solomon 
Islands,  
Fiji Islands 
Financing an evaluation mission to ascertain 
possibilities of short and long-term conflict 
prevention strategies 
May 2002  Sri Lanka  Financing an evaluation mission to ascertain 
possibilities of RRM aid in the peace process 
April 2002  Afghanistan  Financing a series of studies (secure 
nourishment, gender relations and equality, urban 
reconstruction, education and governance) to 
gain up-to-date and in-depth knowledge about 
the situation in Afghanistan and to develop a 
strategy for peace consolidation 
€ 2.5 Mil. 
October 
2002 
Indonesia  -  Supporting Indonesia in the war against 
terrorism 
-  Financing a group of experts 
 
April 2002 
 
Afghanistan  Technical assistance to support the interim 
administration in its anti-drug policies and 
strengthen law enforceability 
€ 0.5 Mil.  
May 2002 
 
 
 
Afghanistan  Promoting public support of the Afghani interim 
administration 
-  Technical assistance for Afghani authorities 
for the co-ordination of support (AACA) 
-  Strengthening the role of the Afghani interim 
administration in big cities 
-  Support of print media 
-  Financial contribution for civilian tasks 
carried out by ISAF (reconstruction of vital 
infrastructure) 
€ 5.9 Mil.  
   20 
May  2002 
 
 
Horn of 
Africa 
Support of the peace initiatives in the Horn of 
Africa 
-  Financing the conference on Somalia’s future 
-  Contribution to the UN fund for border 
demarcation between Eritrea and Ethiopia  
-  Landmine clearing in the Nuba mountains in 
Sudan 
€ 2.6 Mil.  
June 2002 
 
Palestinian 
Authority 
Emergency aid to restore administrative 
capacities of the Palestinian Authority which is 
to guarantee the implementation of other EU 
programmes 
€ 5.0 Mil.  
August 
2002 
 
 
Nepal  Alleviation of effects incurred by the current 
conflict on the long-term EU aid programmes 
-  Promoting local mediation efforts in Midwest 
Nepal 
-  Sustenance of marginalised social groups in 
the Midwest and Terai 
-  Guaranteeing access of groups affected by 
conflict to objective information broadcasting 
and cable radio 
€ 0.615 Mil.  
September 
2002 
 
 
 
Sri Lanka  Financing measures to implement key provisions 
of the cease-fire and to build trust in the peace 
process 
-  Reconstruction of infrastructure 
-  Financial contribution to the peace secretariat 
-  Support of measures of the human rights 
secretariat 
€ 1.8 Mil.  
December 
2002 
Indonesia  Support for the implementation of the peace 
agreement between the Government of Indonesia 
and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM): financing 
of up to  50 international peace monitors for a 
period of six months. 
€ 2.3 Mil.  
December 
2002 
Central 
African 
Support to the mediation efforts of the African 
Union (AU) in the Central African Republic:  
€ 0.4 Mil.    21 
Republic 
(CAR) 
-  Funding for an AU special envoy and for 
setting up an AU liaison office in Bangui for 
a period of six months.  
April 2003  Congo-
Brazzaville 
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) of the so-called Ninja Rebels in the 
Republic of Congo after the signing of a cease-
fire agreement between the rebels and the 
government in March 2003. 
€ 0.713 Mil.  
June 2003  Sri Lanka  Support of the peace process:  
-  Support for the monitoring of the Cease Fire 
Agreement  
-  Rehabilitation of electricity lines at the 
northern checkpoints to improve movement 
of people between the former conflict zones  
-  Support for the Peace Secretariat in order to 
facilitate the dissemination of information 
concerning developments related to the peace 
process to key stakeholders and the 
population.  
-  A contribution of € 2.35 million to the North 
East Reconstruction Fund.  
€ 3.27 Mil.  
June 2003  Liberia  Funding for the immediate launching of 
comprehensive Round-table discussions on 
Liberia with the former Nigerian President Gen. 
Abdulsalami Abubakar acting as mediator. The 
main goal of these discussions is to initiate a 
comprehensive peace process including a cease-
fire agreement. 
€ 0.390 Mil.  
July 2003  Central Asia  -  To ‘kick start’ the first phase of the EC’s 
borders management in Central Asia 
programme (BOMCA)  
-  To contribute to the police assistance 
programme in Kyrgyzstan, which was set up 
by the OSCE.  
€ 2.5 Mil.    22 
Source: Information from the European Commission, Directorate-General External Relations 
 
 
3.2.   Regional prevention activities: building local ownership  
 
As the Overview shows, the lion’s share of prevention cases dealt with by the EU were 
intranational conflicts with escalatory tendencies, possibly expanding to neighbouring states. 
For an example thereof one should note the EU intervention in Kosovo and in Montenegro, to 
save the Western Balkans from an expansion of the conflict. Without the conflict containment 
in Macedonia (including the EU-led mission Concordia), possibly the entire Balkans would 
have turned into a war zone. South Ossetia, Abchasia, Nagorny Kharabach and Javakhetia 
appeared to pose similar dangers for the Caucasus region. By intervening in the Fergana 
valley, the EU tried to prevent an expansion of violent conflicts in Central Asia. 
For the same motives, the EU is engaged in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(including the EU-led mission Arthémis in 2003), and in Ethiopia, in order to not allow the 
Great Lakes region or the Horn of Africa to be sucked entirely into the conflicts’ vortex. By 
contrast, this fate looms over Western Africa, where EU efforts in Nigeria, Liberia and Côte 
d’Ivoire have remained without any notable success. Acute cases of violent escalation such as 
Angola, Zimbabwe and Aceh were on the EU’s prevention list as were regions where co-
operative structures and democracy were being developed in order to inhibit the use of 
violence as a means for particular groups to assert their interests. In some cases, the necessity 
for acute prevention fell together with the necessity for long-term stabilisation, especially in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq
32 (after the military intervention), in the Western Balkans (stability 
pact) and in the Middle East (Palestine). The EU’s goal is to participate in the stabilisation 
process of the country and to counter local violent conflicts early on (post-conflict conflict 
prevention).
33  
                                                                 
32 In the case of Iraq, the EU’s support for the stabilisation process is more conditional than was the case for 
Afghanistan, with very much depending upon the final draft of a possible UN Resolution. See 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=50&Body=Iraq&Body1=inspect# for the most recent 
developments in the UN. 
33 In this context, a statement made by Commissioner Patten in the aftermath of September 11
th is telling: ‘We 
can and should aim to facilitate a political settlement and having facilitated it we then walk away. We have to 
make sure that a better government which will emerge from that sad embittered country will be able to count on 
the long-term support of the international community to rebuild in the ruin of the medieval ferocity which has 
been unleashed on Afghanistan for the last few years.’ In European Commission Statement on the Situation in 
Afghanistan, 2 October 2001. On 13 December 2001, the Commission decided a financial package of EURO 4.9 
Million  as a RRM to begin the political, economic and social (re)construction in Afghanistan and affected 
neighbour states. In the spring of 2002, EU representatives in Afghanistan were faced with the task of sensibly 
using EUR 200 million collected from different programmes. The funds were allocated for reconstruction   23 
The EU’s  influence seems to be greatest if the country of intervention has some 
justifiable hope of joining the EU one day. That is certainly the case in the Western Balkans, 
and this can especially be seen in Macedonia, where the distant hope of future EU 
membership was paired with well developed prevention and crisis management.
34  
 
Case Study: Macedonia 
When ethnic Albanian rebels attacked a Tetovo police station in January 2001, it 
became clear that the country could expect even more serious ethnic conflicts than 
was previously indicated by its struggles for independence in 1991 and the 
shadow of heavy fighting in the neighbourhood. Between February and August 
2001, Macedonia became embroiled in escalating violent conflict between the 
ethnic Albanian extremists (UCK) and regular Macedonian troops. The conflict 
began with local skirmishes before growing to civil war proportions. Together 
with other actors, the EU contributed to stopping the escalation and introducing a 
process of stabilisation. Most of the instruments, procedures and infrastructure 
that Brussels had developed for crisis prevention was used here. 
 
As a more in-depth analysis of the EU’s function in the Macedonia conflict 
shows, the EU, thanks to Solana and his staff, could for the first time assume both 
in Brussels and in the field decisive co-ordinating and mediation tasks.
35 
Supported by a special envoy and equipped with a flexible mandate from the 
Member States, Solana was able to assert the EU’s authority towards the 
conflicting parties and in its co-operation with other actors, especially NATO and 
the U.SA. Weaknesses of earlier prevention attempts were also overcome in this 
case. Via RRM, immediate action resources were available. There was the 
necessary co-ordination between the short-term diplomatic missions of the 
Council and the long-term economic-financial measures of the European 
Commission. The HR and the responsible member of the European Commission 
worked well together and developed a joint policy, which maintained a  clear 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
programmes and the support of social networks to prevent fighting from breaking out again and to dry out a 
source of international terrorism. 
34  See Marie-Janine Calic, ‘The EU and the Balkans: From Association to Membership?’ SWP Comments (7 
May 2003). 
35  For a detailed account of the preventive operation in Macedonia see Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Theory and 
Practice of European Crisis management: Test Case Macedonia’, in 1 European Yearbook of Minority Issues 
(2001/2), pp. 131-154.    24 
division of labour, where Solana acted as crisis manager and Patten provided the 
structural and diplomatic support. The prospect of joining a region of prosperity, 
stability and balanced interests was an important element of reassurance for all 
conflict parties, especially during the escalation phase and the uncertain period 
during the implementation of the Ohrid agreement. It was a blessing for all 
concerned that Brussels had already initiated the stabilisation and association 
process for Southeastern Europe (including  Macedonia) back in early 1999 and 
that the EU representation in Skopje had been elevated to the status of permanent 
delegation of the European Commission in March 2000. The continuous support 
of this rapprochement and elevation process in parallel  with  the critical 
developments in Macedonia was highly effective. In June 2000, the European 
Council emphasised in Santa Maria da Feira that the EU was still striving for the 
broadest possible integration of that region’s countries into the European economy 
and political structure and confirmed that ‘all the countries concerned are potential 
candidates for EU membership.’  
 
After the negotiations were closed at the Zagreb summit in November 2000, the 
Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) as well as an interim agreement were 
decided on in Luxembourg in April 2001. The interim agreement allowed the 
trade and trade-related passages of SAA to go into effect as of June 2001. On 3 
October 2001, the European Commission decided to implement a trust-building 
programme in Macedonia with the help of RRM. The primary goal of this 
programme allocated with EUR 10.3 million was to offer quick support for the 
guidelines accompanying the Ohrid Agreement, which was signed on 13 August 
2001 by the most important political  leaders in the government coalition. It was 
imperative to support the agreement immediately in order to reduce interethnic 
tension and prevent an escalation of the conflict or it spreading to neighbouring 
regions. The package was subject to all the constitutional additions being ratified 
and a new law concerning local administration passed.
36 
 
The NATO engagement helped the conflicting parties overcome daunting 
obstacles in a similar fashion, that is by disarming the UCK, securing the borders 
to neighbouring states and maintaining law and order. The EU’s co-operation with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
36 Source and further information: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/ip01_1368.htm .   25 
other multilateral organisations, primarily NATO, but also the OSCE and the 
World Bank was just as significant during the critical phase of the conflict as the 
access to EU subsidy measures. While in many prevention cases not even the 
exchange of information between the involved international institutions is 
guaranteed, in the case of Macedonia, there was a basis of a common assessment 
of the situation and a consensus of goals. The co-operation and joint appearances 
of HR Solana and NATO General Secretary Robertson in the field contributed to 
urging the conflicting parties to accept compromise, especially in military matters. 
The concerted action of the World Bank and other donor organisations can be 
assessed similarly. In all of these cases, the influence potential of the EU was 
increased through conditioned offers to the conflicting parties.  
 
The lessons learned from postwar situations in Bosnia and Kosovo could also be 
applied by the EU to the preventive activities in Macedonia: an important prerequisite for 
successful intervention is that the international actors have a coherent concept, co-ordinate 
their efforts and use their respective strengths in a division of labour.
37 Finally, a ‘lead 
agency’ which takes the initiative and keeps the process going seems to be indispensable.  
However, conditions like those in Macedonia probably cannot be found or created 
easily in other situations. The EU realistically accepts that there are many intranational violent 
conflicts which are not easily accessible from the outside. The situations in Chechnya and 
Tibet are among them, but also the warlike conflicts in parts of India or the archaic situation 
in North Korea and Algeria. In some of those difficult cases the EU has tried either to use 
pressure or give incentives in order to make governments shift toward more peaceful ways of 
solving local conflict. Individual states have been warned against reverting back to civil war 
(Vietnam), taking repressive measures too far (Myanmar) or repressing self-determination 
rights of ethnic groups with violence (Indonesia). In other cases the EU has threatened to 
introduce sanctions (Zimbabwe) or to discontinue contractual relations (Iran). All of this has 
been done with no convincing immediate success, but with the hope of obtaining incremental 
influence over time.  
                                                                 
37 ‘The Macedonian crisis ... showed that the EU has to act in concert with other actors, most notably with 
NATO, the OSCE and the US. Without these combined efforts which significantly increased the external 
pressure upon the local parties, the settlement and the implementation of the agreement would not have been 
possible. Here again, the course of the crisis highlighted the serious dangers if these actors are not willing to co-
operate, to share information and resources as well as to develop a common platform for action.’ Ulrich 
Schneckener, ‘Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management - Test Case Macedonia’, European Centre for 
Minority Issues, Working Paper 14 (Flensburg 2002), p. 37. 
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With the instrument of group dialogue, the EU has forged a path that is also viable for 
conflict prevention, but this path has of yet been little travelled. The ASEAN countries also 
see themselves as a security policy group, but they have not yet internalised the concept of 
prevention. The EU’s recommendation is that experiences gained in the OSCE could bring 
about progress here. The trade and co-operation treaty between the EU and the Andean Group 
has been restricted to economic goals for too long without addressing the privatisation of 
violence and the influence of the drug Mafia. Non-state violence and drug Mafia power are 
neither restricted to Colombia nor the Andes region. The EU, usually craving the blessing of 
regional co-operation, has not fully used this instrument for prevention purposes. Yet the 
regional approach to conflict prevention seems to be a valuable one as it can combine both the 
geographical and the functional approach. 
 
3.3.   Functional prevention activities: building international regimes  
 
As when dealing with regional prevention cases, the EU approaches horizontal tasks 
by concentrating on a few selected areas. In these cases, it is more difficult to determine the 
degree of success. It may already be considered a success that the EU best recognises the 
common causes of individual instances of violent escalation and the factors regularly 
responsible for the outbreak of civil wars, the proliferation of militant rebellion and repression 
and that in some regions, these phenomena cannot be stopped. The EU devotes itself less 
systematically here to fighting the root causes than it does when dealing with local and 
regional conflicts. This is indicated by the fact that there is no urgent agenda at the presidency 
level for horizontal issues. Nevertheless, EU activities in this field are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively quite impressive. They should be seen as the functional correlation to the list of 
individual conflict cases (see above).  
The list of functional problem areas that the EU has recently devoted itself to includes: 
the scarcity of certain resources (land, fuel, water), inequalities of economic distribution 
(relative poverty, social injustices, underdevelopment), illicit trade (in human beings, drugs, 
diamonds, arms), child soldiers, money laundering,  war entrepreneurs and international 
terrorism. Escalatory conflict factors as determined by the EU include insufficient rights of 
ethnic and religious minorities, the weakness of government systems and the dominance of 
non-democratic, often quasi-military leadership elites.  In addition to the most notorious 
outbreak factors for armed conflicts, such as the treatment of refugees and the clarification of   27 
border disputes, the EU has also included little discussed developments like the privatisation 
of violence as an issue for preventive measures.  
The EU rightly assumes that these horizontal factors cannot be combated only on a 
regional level but must be dealt with globally. There are a number of plausible explanations 
for this. Beyond merely treating the symptoms that arise in conflict areas, it is desirable to 
bring about sustainable changes specifically in the structure of the governments, in the society 
and furthermore in the conflicting parties’ attitudes. Without such a frame of reference, it 
would be impossible to obtain  support from such international organisations as the World 
Bank. However, influencing the dynamics of the local conflict area alone is not enough; in 
order to achieve long-term reorientation, the immediate environment of the region must be 
addressed. Some basic causes of conflict are understandable simply on a larger scale and not 
reducible to local phenomena. And combating conflict causes on a case by case basis is not 
always efficient and should be complemented by legal-structural measures (international 
regimes). But experience and knowledge gained from individual cases can be used to 
generally improve the EU’s prevention policy. 
Standards have been set for dealing with subjects like the rule of law, good 
governance, illicit trade (in human beings, drugs, weapons, precious metals, diamonds, among 
others), and child soldiers. The Kimberley Accord on the diamond trade and the Small Arms 
Convention
38 have allowed us to learn lessons in reducing the destabilising and escalation 
effects of trade. More sensitive is the trade in enriched uranium or biological and chemical 
substances, which can be u sed – possibly by terrorists or unauthorised governments – to 
produce weapons of mass destruction. The strengthening of non-proliferation regimes 
(including missile capability) has recently been moved to the top of the EU’s agenda.
39  
 
Case Study: Small Arms Regimes 
A typical horizontal task is regulating the proliferation of small arms, and the EU 
is intensively committed to this task. Unlike arms control regimes which largely 
originated in the Cold War era, there is no long-standing tradition of contractual 
commitment and verification for controlling small arms (‘micro-disarmament’). 
Possession and use of small arms can traditionally be traced to non-governmental 
                                                                 
38 Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP of 17 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation 
and spread of small arms and light weapons, OJEC [1999] L 9/1. 
39  Council of the European Union 10 June 2003 regarding the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, No. 10352/03. In addition see the Action Plan for the 
implementation of the Basic Principles 13 June 2003 No. 10354/1/03.   28 
actors who use them for illegal deals, criminal purposes or for some sort of 
political motivation. They contribute to the destabilisation of entire regions and 
can, in special cases, be the decisive factor for the violent escalation of political 
conflicts, as seen by the armament of the UCK in Macedonia. On the other hand, 
small arms in the hands of state security bodies can be important prerequisites to 
enforce law and to create domestic security. Where these elements are absent, 
there is the danger that citizens will resort to self-defence and want to use 
weapons of their own. 
  
A series of guidelines and decisions of the EU Council as well as countless reports 
of the European Commission and resolutions of the European Parliament have 
addressed the uncontrolled trade of small arms for many years.
40 The EU as a 
whole has taken the lead in the fight against the destructive effects of the small 
arms trade, for example with the code of conduct
41 for export to Third Countries, 
(already passed in 1998), and with a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers,
42 
which declares war on the destabilising proliferation and agglomeration of small 
arms. In terms of prevention policy, the small arms trade is named in the Joint 
Report as a central, long-term priority (see Paragraph 19).  
 
These activities have made the EU one of the most active members of the UN 
Conference on small arms and light weapons
43; thanks to the Joint Action, the EU 
could assume a clear and well-defined position. The EU is striving for legally 
binding measures which would allow export control criteria, the labelling and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
40 Second Annual Report on the implementation of the EU Joint Action of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons 
(2002/589/CFSP) and  repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, and the EU Programme on illicit  trafficking in 
conventional arms of June 1997 (8 October 2002). The Rt. Hon Chris Patten, Commissioner for External 
Relations: Commission statement on arms exports, European Parliament - Plenary session Strasbourg, 2 October 
2001. Gary Titley, Report on the Council's Third Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the 
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy), 10  September 2002. 
41 European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 5 June 1998 No: 8675/2/98 REV 2:  
http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ExportCTRL/en/8675_2_98_en.pdf. 
42 Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP of 17 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation 
and spread of small arms and light weapons, OJEC [1999] L 9/1. 
43 Herbert Wulf, ‘Kleinwaffen - die Massenvernichtungswaffen unserer Zeit. Die Bemühungen der Vereinten 
Nationen um Mikroabrüstung.’ - In 49 Vereinte Nationen No. 5 (2001) pp. 174-178. United Nations Conference 
on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. New York, 9 -20 July 2001  
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/     29 
search for arms as well as information exchange, and these measures would take 
into consideration ways and means to prevent overproduction and other market 
controlling measures. Brussels is pushing for a continuation of the activities 
initiated at the UN Conference. In the EU’s view, the import and customs sectors 
in conflict-prone countries deserve special attention as trade, also small arms 
trade, can be best regulated from there. The EU has concentrated on critical 
countries and regions in order to enforce control based upon UN and OSCE 
standards as well as its own code of conduct. In Bosnia, one of the most efficient 
EU programmes has devoted itself to establishing the Customs and Fiscal 
Assistance Office (CAFAO), not least to keep the uncontrolled flow of small arms 
better in check. Despite the positive examples, it has become clear that the internal 
obstacles within the EU still present an even bigger problem.
  
 
Experiences from such initiatives at functional conflict prevention have also proven 
valuable for all other horizontal activities. Part of the lessons learnt is the sober fact that the 
good intentions connected with conflict prevention may turn out to be untrue or may lead – in 
some cases – to a negative impact. Even the panacea of democratic development
44 must be re-
evaluated in terms of whether it does not actually accentuate the conflicting parties’ 
antagonisms towards each other instead of leading them towards peaceful competition. 
Similarly, the effect of the media in conflicts can be ambivalent; at times it can glorify 
violence, but also, as independent sources of information, it can guarantee transparency. It can 
dangerously exaggerate ethnic differences but also foster dialogue between different ethnic 
groups. Even more critical is the question, or even unspoken reproach, that the EU’s 
development policy could itself contribute to the escalation of local conflicts. The notorious 
incompetence of local partners gives birth to the justified fear that Brussels could 
inadvertently help anchor repressive structures in certain countries because of the necessity of 
co-operating with whoever is in power. That is why the issues of good governance and the 
emphasis of participatory politics are increasingly significant. 
Pitfalls and deficiencies of the above-mentioned kind are not only limited to functional 
conflict prevention. It must be assumed that they occur in cases of acute and regional 
preventative activities as well. This is not a motivating environment. Disillusionment must be 
                                                                 
44 This is not the place to evaluate individual human rights or other programmes. But it is necessary to mention 
at least in passing that some of these programmes have become alarmingly reduced to rote, assembly-line 
activities. The often cited example of Brussels’ praised first measure for the democratisation of Congo – the 
purchase of several hundred ballot boxes – is no exaggeration. Naturally, a group of merchants has emerged,   30 
considered as a limiting factor when planning to extend investments in conflict prevention. It 
would be wrong to conclude that prevention does not work, rather the lessons should be used 
to do better and to improve the record. Prevention is a profession with a long learning curve. 
 
4.  RAISING THE STAKES AND MAKING USE OF THE UNION’S ASSETS  
 
As the results of the first phase of targeted prevention activities show, the EU is still in 
the  infant  stages of a learning process in terms of a systematic and successful conflict 
prevention policy. Although it has introduced the concept of conflict prevention into all its 
institutions and was able to shorten the span from conflict warning to early action, the 
measures taken and their actual effects remain modest. Either the measures were taken in 
geographical proximity (the Balkans) or they affected horizontal issues of a limited range 
(small arms code of conduct). An intensive examination of each case and topic that the EU 
has dealt with in the context of conflict prevention could help the EU to more selectively 
widen the arsenal of conflict prevention instruments and to develop a more efficient 
prevention strategy in the future. 
The rather chequered balance sheet could also be due to the fact that it is simply too 
early, and the fruits of the most recent reforms still have to grow before progress is more 
recognisable. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that introduced internal changes are too 
weak for a number of reasons to consistently retool the EU as a conflict prevention actor and 
prepare it for an internationally significant role.  The c reation of capabilities, procedural 
agreement, joint declarations and actions of the Fifteen are already hailed as successes. The 
actual effects of these achievements in the conflict areas themselves are a different story. 
Indeed, the EU shies away from the difficult violent conflicts (such as Chechnya) or curbing 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (as in North Korea).  
It seems that the arsenal of motivation which drives the EU to run more ambitious 
conflict prevention activities is not strong enough to allow for wider risk taking and to focus 
more on the outcome than on the output of its policies. From the start, the EU has set its sights 
on a lower level of addressing international conflict. Brussels did not aspire to the role of a 
leading power in the area of conflict prevention. It seems driven by the restrictions of its 
operative options rather than by the strategic reach of its responsibilities. The Union talks 
abundantly about its particular assets, but it forgets to use them.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
specialised in the market these ‘immediate actions’ have created.  